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This paper investigates how the interplay of parties’ preferences, political
institutions and electoral competition affects the liberalization of immigra-
tion policies. It joins a growing body of research that focuses on the role
of domestic factors in shaping immigration policies. While several stud-
ies point to the important role of partisanship and the activation of public
opinion, they fail to provide a clear mechanism that takes into account dif-
ferences in parties’ preferences as well as the institutional context they act
in. By adding two crucial factors to the analysis, this paper presents a new
framework for liberal change in the field of immigration politics. First, in-
stitutional veto points determine if left-of-center parties can reform policies
according to their preferences. Second, the degree of electoral competition
and the politicization of immigration issues affect how susceptible political
parties are to the anti-immigrant sentiment in the population. A time-series
cross-section analysis of 11 countries from 1980-2006 shows that left-of-center
governments are more likely to pass liberal reforms, but only if they are not
facing an open veto point. Moreover, increased levels of electoral competition
coupled with a politicization of the immigration issue reduces the likelihood
of liberal reforms.
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1 Introduction
While immigration has been a central issue in the social sciences for a long time, a sys-
tematic comparative analysis of actual policies is quite new to the discipline. Starting
with Rogers Brubaker’s (1992) analysis of citizenship policies1 in Germany and France
a growing body of research has investigated similarities and differences in national legal
practices concerning citizenship and immigration. Several scholars argue that as a result
of global social phenomena such as de-nationalization, transnationalism and the growing
impact of human rights norms, immigration policies have been liberalized throughout
industrialized democracies over the past decades (Sassen, 2008; Soysal, 1994). These
approaches, however, fail to account for the diverging trends that can be observed in
advanced democracies and especially within Europe. While there is little doubt that
globalization and transnationalism create a general pressure to adapt immigration poli-
cies (such as naturalization requirements, birth rights and dual citizenship), the view
that this pressure inevitably leads to liberalization has been challenged on theoretical
as well as empirical grounds. Hence, growing attention has been directed towards the
role of domestic political factors in shaping policy outcomes in this field, with the main
focus on the role of political parties and public opinion as determinants of liberaliz-
ing policies (Howard, 2006; Joppke, 2003; Hansen and Köhler, 2005). Based on their
ideological predisposition left-of-center parties are associated with liberalization and de-
ethnicization while the opposite is true for conservative and right-wing parties (Joppke,
2003; Helbling, 2013). Facing a highly immigration-skeptic and latently xenophobic
public, however, even left-wing governments will refrain from liberalization if this public
opinion gets “activated” through a campaign, a referendum or a successful radical-right
party (Howard, 2009, 2010).
1While this study focuses on immigration policies, a part of the literature deals with the more nar-
row area of citizenship policies, which can be regarded as a subfield of immigration policies. The
hypothesis derived in this paper build on those insights that can be reasonably transferred to the
more general field.
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While this body of literature makes an important contribution to the research on citi-
zenship and immigration policies, the assumed process of policy-making in these studies
is to a large degree underspecified. All these studies model the law-making process as a
direct transformation of actors’ preferences into policy outputs and thereby neglect the
role of political institutions. It is assumed that parties’ ideological preferences are di-
rectly transferred into liberalization or conservative stability and that public opinion, if
activated, simply keeps politicians from reform efforts. In consequence, these approaches
fail to acknowledge the factors that determine if the preferences of government parties,
indeed, lead to policy change as well as those that affect parties’ reactiveness to public
opinion.
This article aims at bridging this gap by providing a novel framework for the liberal-
ization of immigration policies that takes into account parties’ policy change capability
as well as the impact of electoral competition on parties’ preferences.2 First, institu-
tional veto points determine if left-of-center governments have the opportunity to pass
legislation that will liberalize immigration policies. If right-wing parties hold a major-
ity in a chamber of parliament that needs to agree to legislation, it gives these parties
an opportunity to block liberal reforms. Second, the degree of electoral competition
that governing parties are facing determines their trade-off between vote- and office-
or policy-seeking and thus affects how likely governments will pass unpopular reforms.
This, however, depends on the saliency of the immigration issue. When electoral com-
petition is high, parties cannot ignore a politicized issue paired with an anti-immigrant
public sentiment, which in turn will block liberalization.
Analyzing a new data set that combines information on immigration reforms with data
on political institutions, political majorities, issue salience and electoral competition
2This paper limits itself to analyzing liberalization as the politics of restrictive change should follow
a fundamentally different logic because they are far less an exercise in blame avoidance and should
depend on different agenda setting events. Integrating these diverging incentives lies beyond the
scope of this paper.
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for eleven industrialized democracies from 1980-2006, this paper demonstrates that the
liberalization of immigration policies depends on veto points and the competitiveness of
elections. Left-of-center governments are only more likely to pass liberalizing reforms
if these reforms cannot be blocked by an open veto point. Moreover, high levels of
electoral competition in the context of a politicized issue reduce governments’ efforts to
liberalize immigration policies. These findings demonstrate the necessity of taking the
institutional context as well as parties’ strategic incentives into account when analyzing
policy-making in the field of citizenship and immigration.
2 The Politics of Citizenship and Immigration
The literature on citizenship and immigration policies can largely be separated into
two categories. One branch emphasizes the various pressures that should lead to more
liberalization. The other one analyzes domestic factors that can account for national
variations in policy outcomes.
Looking at the changing role of the nation-state, researchers have emphasized three
developments as driving forces of policy liberalization in the area of citizenship and
immigration: globalization and internationalization (Sassen, 2008); the growing impor-
tance of human rights in international politics (Soysal, 1994) and the changed conception
of citizenship as a result of large amounts of immigration (Geddes, 2003; Hansen and
Weil, 2001; Joppke, 1999). All these developments are strongly linked to each other,
manifested in the decreasing role of the nation-state and national politics and are finally
supposed to result in more liberal policies as an answer to these challenges.
However, looking at the de facto development throughout the industrialized democra-
cies, which all share these changing contextual conditions, one can see significant vari-
ation in the degree to which these countries have actually liberalized their immigration
policies.
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[Insert Figure 1 - Restrictiveness of Immigration Laws over Time - about here]
This is demonstrated in Figure 1 which shows the developments of immigration policies
since 1980 based on data collected by Ortega and Peri (2013). Not taking into account
historical variation (all countries start at 0) it indicates how two sets of policies (“stay”
and “entry”) have developed over time (with higher values indicating more restrictive
policies). While some countries such as Sweden or Canada have seen substantial liberal
change through, for example, the reduction of residence requirements for naturalization
others have remained the same or, as in the case of Denmark, have even increased their
restrictiveness. Conditions such as globalization and growing numbers of immigrants,
which all these countries have in common, cannot account for these diverging trajec-
tories. Hence, it is necessary to investigate variations in domestic politics in order to
explain the different outcomes in these countries (see also Koopmans, Michalowski and
Waibel, 2012; Vink and Groot, 2010). This is not to say that the international dimension
does not matter at all. On the contrary, these conditions constitute an essential part
of the pressure for policy liberalization. However this pressure is not inevitably trans-
formed into reforms. The literature on domestic politics determinants of citizenship and
immigration policies has identified two sets of factors that play a key role in explaining
variations in national policies: parties’ political ideology as well as issue salience and
anti-immigration public attitudes.
2.1 Political Parties and Veto Points
As in several other policy areas, scholars have argued that the ideological preferences of
political parties play a crucial role for differences in policy outcomes in the field of citi-
zenship and immigration. Left-wing parties are associated with de-ethnicizing policies,
i.e. measures to open access to citizenship to newcomers and allow membership apart
from ethnic elements through, for example, the introduction of ius soli elements (Joppke,
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2003, 436). On the other hand, conservative and right-wing parties favor re-ethnicization
including a new focus on common cultural heritage and values (Joppke, 2003, 442). Hel-
bling (2013) also demonstrates how left-of-center parties use less nationalistic and more
moral-universal frames when addressing issues of immigration. Hence, the liberalization
of citizenship and immigration policies should be strongly linked to efforts of left-wing
parties, while blockage, exclusion and more restrictive measures are part of the con-
servative agenda. While scholars in the field of citizenship policies seem to generally
agree that left-wing parties are associated with a more liberal ideology (Howard, 2009;
Janoski, 2010), one might question if these preferences can be generalized to the whole
field of immigration policies (see also Givens and Luedtke, 2005). Figure 2 and Figure
3, thus, provide empirical evidence on this question.
[Insert Figure 2 - Parties’ Policy Positions on Immigration (CHES Data) - about
here]
Figure 2 presents parties’ immigration policy preferences based on data from the
Chapel Hill Expert Survey in 2006 and 2010 (Bakker et al., 2014). We can see the
distribution of positions separately for Social democratic and Conservative (including
Christian democratic and secular Conservative parties) parties with higher values indi-
cating more restrictive positions. While the median for Social democratic parties lies
at 4.4, it is 6.9 for Conservative parties and thus substantively higher (we are dealing
with a 10 point scale). The difference is also highly statistically significant. Figure 2
thus indicates that Social democratic parties hold substantially more liberal positions on
immigration issues than their conservative competitors. One caveat of using the CHES
data for this comparison is that expert judgements for parties’ immigration positions
are limited to the years 2006 and 2010.
[Insert Figure 3 - Parties’ Policy Positions on Immigration (Manifesto Data) -
about here]
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Figure 3 thus presents the same graph based on manifesto data from the CMP/MARPOR
project (Volkens et al., 2013). The advantage of using this graph is that it includes data
reaching back to 1980. However, the manifesto data unfortunately does not include
a specific category for immigration. The coding of the immigration positions for this
graph, thus, follows Alonso and da Fonseca (2011) and includes several categories such
as positions on multiculturalism and national way of life.3 Again, we can see that
Conservative parties have considerably stronger anti-immigrant positions than Social
democratic parties. This difference as well is highly statistically significant. Hence, the
empirical evidence clearly supports the claim that mainstream left parties hold more
liberal positions than the mainstream right when it comes to immigration policies.
This, however, does not necessarily mean that left-wing parties in government will
inevitably lead to a liberalization of citizenship and immigration policies (see for ex-
ample Koopmans, Michalowski and Waibel, 2012). Although it is reasonable to argue
that parties’ ideological preferences matter for changes in immigration policies, directly
inferring policy outputs from a government’s ideological composition largely ignores the
institutional context of policy-making. While governments at some point may want to
liberalize policies, they might lack the political opportunity to do so. In order to deter-
mine a government’s policy change capability, it is necessary to look at the institutional
veto points in a specific policy making context. The veto point approach (Immergut,
1990, 1992) considers the political decision-making process as a chain of decisions made
in several political arenas and looks at the institutions necessary to enable legislation. A
veto point is by definition a counter-majoritarian political institution that gives political
and societal actors the opportunity to block legislation. It should be emphasized that
veto points by themselves do not block legislation, but their effect depends on political
majorities. Veto points impede changes only if they are “open,” that is if government
3The exact procedure of the coding is to subtract the shares of pro immigration issues (per607 and
per705 in the data) from the negative issues (per601, per602 and per608 in the data).
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parties do not hold a majority in these arenas (Immergut, 2010). Hence, veto points in
a dynamic way determine governments’ capability to change the status quo.
For the case of immigration policies, open veto points should, thus, determine govern-
ments’ opportunities for liberal change. While a left-of-center government may want to
liberalize policies, if it faces a chamber with a right-of-center majority and the power to
block legislation, this will significantly impede the chances for reform. Not taking the
role of veto points into account when analyzing immigration policies is a potential source
for the diverging empirical findings in this field. Left-wing governments are only capable
of passing liberal legislation if they command the necessary majorities in all legislative
arenas. This leads us to hypothesis 1.
H 1 Left-of-center governments are only more likely to pass liberal reforms if they are
not facing an open veto point.
2.2 Public Opinion and Electoral Competition
The second set of factors that has been emphasized when explaining national differences
in citizenship and immigration policies is public opinion and issue salience. As the
electorate throughout all industrialized democracies can be described as highly critical
of immigrants and latently xenophobic (see for example Citrin et al., 1997; Sides and
Citrin, 2007), and public policy in democracies is accountable to the preferences of the
electorate, liberalizing citizenship and immigration policies becomes a challenging task
for democratic governments (Breunig, Cao and Luedtke, 2012). However, a law-making
process behind closed doors with as little public attention as possible should generally
favor liberalizing change (Givens and Luedtke, 2005). This particularly results from
interest groups and elites having an interest in liberalization, high-skilled immigration,
and legal security for immigrants. The lower issue salience and public attention, so
the argument goes, the higher the possibility of interest groups to influence the policy-
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making process and the higher the possibility for parties to find consensus and forge
agreements. However, if the debate is expanded, issue salience increased and the public
more attentive, harmonized and liberalizing policy change becomes much less likely
(Givens and Luedtke, 2004; Hansen and Köhler, 2005).
Combining these approaches with parties’ ideological predispositions, Howard develops
a framework for explaining liberal change and restrictive continuity of citizenship policies
(Howard, 2009, 2010). While left parties in government are a necessary condition for
liberal change, as soon as the generally migration skeptic public gets “activated” through
the existence of a successful radical right party, a referendum or a popular movement,
the reform efforts of a government can be blocked. Using the vote share of radical right
parties as an indicator for the activation of the public and correlating it with changes
in a newly developed citizenship policy index, Howard presents empirical evidence in
support of his hypothesis (Howard, 2010).
While Howard’s research without any doubt marks an important step towards a more
coherent analysis of citizenship and immigration policies, there are some significant prob-
lems with his analysis both at an empirical and a theoretical level. Empirically, using
correlations with average radical right support over time, (in addition to the obvious
risk of omitted variable bias) is highly problematic as changes in the citizenship policy
index are not gradual, but the result of one or two reforms at specific moments in time.
Hence, investigating a linear continuous impact of radical right support is not adequate.
It is necessary to analyze which conditions were present or absent when governments
successfully liberalized their citizenship and immigration regimes. In addition to this,
theoretically, it remains unclear how public opinion on immigration affects governing
parties and why “activation” should always block reforms. Parties vary in their recep-
tiveness to public opinion and will choose their policy strategies mainly as a function
of political competition (Kitschelt, 2002). Hence, the important question to be asked is
8
why and under what circumstances public opinion matters to politicians in the context
of immigration reform.
In order to conceptualize parties’ reactiveness to public opinion, it is necessary to take
parties’ diverging preferences into account. In the literature on party competition there
is agreement that parties’ preferences can be divided into vote-, office- and policy-seeking
(Strøm, 1990). Stating that an activated public opinion inevitably will block parties’
reform efforts only focuses on a party’s vote-seeking strategy. If an important issue
has been politicized, from a vote-seeking perspective it would be a strategic mistake to
pass legislation that goes against the electorate’s preferences. However, from an office-
and policy-seeking perspective parties should not necessarily follow this strategy. While
being tough on immigration might constitute a vote-maximizing strategy, it will likely
alienate moderate parties whose support can be necessary to form a coalition (Green-
Pedersen and Krogstrup, 2008). Similarly, as discussed earlier, parties are subject to
various forms of pressures by elite-groups that favor more liberal policies. These are
not only activist- and traditionally left groups but also employer associations who have
business interests in more liberal policies (Bale, 2008). Hence, following their office- and
policy-seeking goals, parties have an incentive to take a more liberal stance on citizenship
and immigration policies.
A central factor that determines parties’ trade-offs between vote-seeking strategies
on the one hand and policy- and office-seeking on the other is the degree of electoral
competition that they are facing (Strøm, 1990; Robertson, 1976). If competition is high,
that is, if small changes in votes can lead to big changes in parties’ seat share and
bargaining position, then parties will follow a vote-maximizing strategy (Immergut and
Abou-Chadi, 2014; Abou-Chadi and Orlowski, 2016). However, if parties are rather
insulated from competition, office- and policy-seeking motivations should dominate and
government parties should become more likely to pass unpopular legislation. Hence,
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for the case of immigration reform this means that higher levels of electoral competition
should decrease governments’ propensity to introduce liberal changes. Hypothesis 2 thus
states:
H 2 Increasing electoral competitiveness decreases the likelihood of liberal immigration
reforms.
The effect of electoral competitiveness, however, should depend on the salience of the
immigration issue. As long as issue salience is low, government parties do not necessarily
have to worry about the degree of electoral competition as voters’ vote choice is only
affected by the issues that they perceive as salient (Bélanger and Meguid, 2008). Yet,
in the context of a politicized issue, politicians will not ignore the threat posed by high
levels of competition and an anti-immigrant public mood. This can be summarized as
hypothesis 3.
H 3 If issue salience is low, increasing electoral competitiveness will matter less for the
likelihood of liberal immigration reforms.
3 Data, Operationalization and Method
In order to test these hypotheses, I rely on a novel data set that includes information on
immigration reforms as well as political institutions, political majorities, issue salience
and a new measure of electoral competition at the party level. The data consists of
country-years for 11 parliamentary democracies from 1980 to 2006.4
The dependent variable measuring liberal changes in immigration policies is based
on data collected by Ortega and Peri (2013), which contains updated information on
4The countries included in this study are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Nether-
lands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK. Compared to the original data set this study
includes the USA, Luxembourg and Japan. Japan and Luxembourg for data availability reasons
and the US as a presidential system where party competition follows different incentives.
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immigration laws in OECD countries that has originally been gathered by Mayda and
Patel (2004). Based on these laws Ortega and Peri (2009) construct two sets of indices
that measure the tightness of “entry” and “stay” laws for non-asylum immigrants. Lib-
eralizing change for entry laws includes for example lower requirements for entry and
work permits. In the area of stay laws liberalization means for instance a reduction in
the number of years necessary to obtain a residence permit or citizenship. Hence, while
these laws focus on non-asylum migrants, they are not limited to labor migration but
include legislation that for example concerns family reunification.5 As mentioned before,
both indices are set to the value 0 for 1980 and thus only focus on changes within this
time period excluding any type of historical variation. The graphical representation of
these two indicators over time can be found in Figure 1. For the following analyses I
use a dummy variable immigration reform that is coded 1 if a liberalizing change occurs
in a year in either one of these two areas and 0 otherwise. This leads to a distribu-
tion where a liberal reform occurs in about 20% of the country-years. In order to have
a clear reference category (i.e no change), I exclude cases with restrictive reforms. I
present additional analyses that use a multinomial logit model which avoids excluding
these cases.
Four independent variables are necessary to test the hypotheses formulated in this arti-
cle: government ideology, veto points, degree of electoral competition and issue salience.
I define left government as a government that does not include a conservative or other
right-wing party. This coding of government ideology differs from other studies which
calculate some variant of a weighted average of government parties’ policy positions
(Koopmans, Michalowski and Waibel, 2012; Breunig and Luedtke, 2008). In contrast to
this operationalization and in line with the configurational argumentation proposed in
this article, I follow a veto player logic of policy making (Tsebelis, 2002). A left gov-
5A detailed description of the laws can be found here: http://migration.oxfordjournals.org /con-
tent/1/1/47/suppl/DC1
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ernment is not defined by its degree of “leftness” but by the absence of a conservative
partisan veto player, i.e. a right-wing party in government that has the potential to
block legislation. This reflects the argument that left-of-center parties should be more
likely to liberalize immigration policies because of their general ideology rather than be-
come linearly more likely to liberalize with every point of being more left on a scale that
largely reflects socio-economic considerations. Left-of-center parties are Social demo-
cratic, green and radical left parties. Conservative, Christian democratic and radical
right parties are defined as right-wing parties.
In comparative politics and political economy there now exists an abundance of mea-
sures for institutional fragmentation in general and veto points in particular (Keefer
and Stasavage, 2003; Henisz, 2000; Schmidt, 2000; Huber and Stephens, 2001). Most
of these measures derive veto points (or veto players) from countries’ constitutions and
create time-constant additive indices which include a multitude of political and societal
factors. More in line with the original theory, I follow a dynamic operationalization of
veto points that only includes political institutions that have the power to block leg-
islation and takes into account political majorities in these arenas. A dummy variable
for open veto point is coded 1 if a government does not hold the majority in the first
or second chamber as well as if a president with veto power exists and comes from an
opposition party. Interacted with the dummy for left government this measure can be
used to evaluate hypothesis 1. Left governments face an open veto point in 60 percent
of the cases and right governments in 40 percent of them.
In order to investigate the effect of electoral competitiveness, I employ a novel measure
proposed by Abou-Chadi and Orlowski (2016). This measure is based on the conception
that parties’ office gains and their possibilities to influence policy in multi-party systems
are dependent on their bargaining position in the legislative party system (see also Laver
and Benoit, 2014). Degrees of electoral competition should, thus, be understood as the
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relationship between changes in votes and changes in the legislative party position. In
order to capture this, the measure consists of two components. First, it estimates how
insulated parties are against vote shifts; that is how many votes a party has to win or
lose until changes in the legislative party system occur. In the hypothetical case of a
pure two-party system with an electoral system that is a hundred per cent proportional
a party’s insulation is equal to its margin of victory at the previous election. In the real
world of multi-party competition and non-proportional electoral systems, measuring
insulation becomes of course a lot more difficult. Orlowski (2014) derives a measure
for insulation that takes into account the electoral system, geographical distributions of
party competition and which parties are more likely to attract voters from one another.
Linking a party’s seat share to its own and every other party’s vote share, it is possible
to calculate how many votes a party needs to win or has to lose until its bargaining
position changes. Secondly, the measure includes estimates of the likelihood of these
vote shifts based on individual-level analyses of vote choices. Following the idea of a
“normal vote” (Converse, 1966) this method predicts future election results based on
the number of party identifiers and the effect of party identification on vote choices.
The resulting composite measure of electoral competitiveness ranges from 0 to 1 for
every party. It represents the probability of a vote shift occuring that is big enough to
surpass the insulation boundaries for a given party. In order to test hypothesis 2, I use
the competitiveness value for the party that represents the head of government and is
thus primarily associated with setting policy. For the analyzed sample this is always
the value for the mainstream right or mainstream left party in a country. Since the
estimation procedure for the competitiveness measure requires several data sources, the
availability of this measure reduces the sample to 9 countries for the models that include
the competitiveness measure.6
6For Switzerland the government mean is used. All results are robust to excluding Switzerland from
the analysis
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Evaluating hypothesis 3 requires a measure of issue salience of the immigration is-
sue. The analyses, thus, include a variable representing the party system agenda for
immigration issues based on party manifestos at the previous election. Parties need to
systematically address issues that have made it onto the public agenda. While many
issues appear on and disappear from the public agenda, once issues have made it to the
party system agenda (i.e. they have been picked up by established parties), they can
be regarded as politicized because they will affect party competition surrounding these
issues (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2015, 2010). The party system agenda can be
measured as the average issue attention of all parties in government (Green-Pedersen
and Mortensen, 2015). Based on data from the CMP/MARPOR project and using the
operationalization suggested by Alonso and da Fonseca (2011), I include a measure of
the party system agenda on immigration and in order to test hypothesis 3 interact it
with the degree of electoral competitiveness.
All models include several control variables that have been shown or hypothesized to
affect citizenship and immigration policies and are potentially correlated with the main
independent variables of interest. In order to control for the amount of immigration to
a country, I include a measure of immigration per capita in the previous year based on
OECD data on inflow of foreign population. While a large number of immigrants on
the one hand might make the public less open to liberal reforms, they also constitute
a potential electoral group when naturalized (Koopmans, 2013). As standard controls
for a country’s exposure to globalization and changes in economic performance I include
measures for trade openness and economic growth. Both variables come from the Com-
parative Welfare States data set (Brady, Huber and Stephens, 2014). Several scholars
argue that the dynamics of immigration and the political economy of the welfare state
are inherently linked to each other (Brady and Finnigan, 2014; Schierup, Hansen and
Castles, 2006). Hence, all models control for welfare state generosity measured through
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the combined generosity index provided by Scruggs, Jahn and Kuitto (2014). Addi-
tionally I control for a country’s membership in the European Union and the strength
of judicial review, both coded as dummy variables. EU membership and strong courts
have been shown to increase the pressure for liberalizing policies in the field of citizen-
ship and multiculturalism (Joppke, 2001). I also include a dummy variable for radical
right representation which is coded 1 if a radical right party is represented in parlia-
ment. Parliamentary representation provides radical right parties with several tools to
influence the public agenda and to politicize the issue of immigration. The coding of
which parties belong to the radical right family follows Abou-Chadi (2014) and Mudde
(2007).
Since immigration reform is measured through a binary indicator, I use a logit model
to estimate the effects of my independent variables. The time-series cross-section nature
of the data calls for some model adaptations. I follow Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998)
and correct for serial dependence by including a spell counter (for the years leading up
to a reform) and three natural cubic splines. In addition to this, the standard errors are
clustered by countries. Variations of this approach including a cloglog link instead of a
logit link and the cubic polynomial splines suggested by (Carter and Signorino, 2010)
can be found in the Appendix. The Appendix also presents the results of a negative
binomial model which avoids dichotomizing the change variable and thus also considers
the variation of the magnitude of liberalization. All main findings presented here are
robust against these alternative specifications.
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4 Results
4.1 Main Findings
Table 1 presents the results for the regression analysis of liberal citizenship and immigra-
tion reforms. As a result of the logit specification, we cannot meaningfully interpret the
size of the b-coefficients. They provide us, however, with information about the direction
of the effect on the probability of a liberal reform occurring. The more substantive in-
terpretations that will follow are all based on predicted probabilities. Model 1 shows the
effect of the independent variables without any interaction specified. We can see that
while the variable for left government has a positive effect it fails to reach statistical
significance. Hence, based on this model we cannot conclude that left-of-center gov-
ernments are more likely to pass liberal immigration reforms than other governments.
In line with evidence from small and large N studies, the presence of a radical right
party in parliament, however, on average significantly reduces the likelihood of liberal
reform. Three other control variables show an effect that reaches conventional levels of
statistical significance. There is a significant positive effect for the size of immigration
inflow into a country, which speaks for the idea that higher levels of immigration increase
the incentive for liberal policies. However, reverse causality is clearly an issue here. It
might very well be that more liberal policies lead to higher levels of immigration. Again
underlining the findings of previous studies, EU membership and strong courts have a
positive effect and increase the likelihood of liberal change in the area of citizenship and
immigration.
[Insert Table 1 - Determinants of Immigration Reform - about here]
Model 2 includes an interaction term between left government and open veto point in
order to evaluate hypothesis 1. Following this hypothesis we should expect to see that
the difference between left and right-of-center governments is stronger in the absence of
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a veto point. Indeed, Model 2 now shows a statistically significant positive effect for
the left government constitutive term. However, since we are dealing with a non-linear
model, interpreting an interaction effect from the coefficients presented in the regression
table is not advisable. Hence, Figure 2 presents the predicted probabilities for this
relationship. All other independent variables are held at their observed values (Hanmer
and Ozan Kalkan, 2013).
[Insert Figure 4 - Predicted Probabilities - Government Ideology and Veto Points
- about here]
Figure 4 shows how the effect of government ideology on reform likelihood depends on
the existence of veto points. It gives the predicted probability of a liberal reform (with
a 95% CI) for four different scenarios. In the absence of an open veto point we can see
a clear statistically significant difference between left and right-of-center governments.
The predicted probability of a liberal reform for a left government without a veto point is
about 0.4. For non-left governments in the same constellation the predicted probability
is 0.2 and thus 20 points lower. Considering that the base probability of a liberal reform
occurring is about 0.2 this constitutes a substantive difference. In contrast, if there is an
open veto point, we do not find a statistically significant difference between governments
of different ideologies. The predicted probabilities for these two scenarios are nearly
identical at around 0.23. The absence of a statistically significant difference in this
case is, thus, nearly completely caused by the reduced probability for left governments.
Hence, confirming hypothesis 1, left-of-center governments only increase the likelihood
of a liberal reform occurring if they are not facing an open veto point. While some left
governments may want to liberalize policies, in the presence of an open veto point, they
lack the political opportunity to do so.
The results from Model 3 allow us to evaluate the predictions of hypothesis 2. It
includes the measure of the level of electoral competitiveness that government parties
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are facing. Since this measure is not available for Australia and Belgium, the number
of cases in this model is reduced. The newly added variable for competitiveness has
a negative and highly statistically significant effect. Hence, when government parties
expect elections to be more competitive this reduces the likelihood of immigration policy
liberalization. Figure 5 provides predicted probabilities that demonstrate the substantive
size of this effect.
[Insert Figure 5 - Predicted Probabilities - Electoral Competitiveness - about
here]
Figure 5 shows how the predicted probability for immigration policy liberalization
decreases with higher levels of electoral competitiveness. While the predicted proba-
bility for liberalization amounts to about 35 percent for low levels of competitiveness
this likelihood is reduced to around 17 percent. This substantive effect, thus, supports
hypothesis 2. When competitiveness is high government parties become less likely to
liberalize immigration policies as potential vote losses in these cases would be a lot more
harmful for their prospects of being in power or influencing policy more generally.
However, as argued in hypothesis 3, this effect should depend on immigration being a
politically salient issue. In order to evaluate this Model 4 includes an interaction effect
of issue salience and electoral competitiveness. The average marginal effect and the
predicted probabilities necessary to interpret this effect can be found in Figure 6 and 7.
[Insert Figure 6 - Average Marginal Effect - Electoral Competitiveness and Issue
Salience - about here]
[Insert Figure 7 - Predicted Probabilities - Electoral Competitiveness and Issue
Salience - about here]
Figure 6 presents the average marginal effect of electoral competitiveness on the like-
lihood of liberal reforms depending on the level of issue salience. The shaded area
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represents the 95% confidence interval around the marginal effect. For lower levels of
issue salience (parties dedicating less than 1 percent of their manifestos to immigra-
tion issues) we can see that the confidence bounds include 0 and our effect is thus not
statistically significant. More than 25% of the cases in this sample fall into this cate-
gory. For higher levels of issue salience we then see that the average marginal effect of
electoral competitiveness increases in magnitude and becomes statistically significant.
The substantive difference of this effect becomes clear when looking at the differences in
predicted probabilities presented in Figure 7.
Figure 7 shows the relationship between electoral competitiveness and the likelihood
of a liberal reform for two different levels of issue salience. The left panel shows the
effect of competitiveness for a relatively low level of issue salience (value 0.5) and the
right panel presents the same relationship for a higher level of issue salience (value
3). Whereas for a higher level of salience we can see how increasing competitiveness
significantly reduces the likelihood of a liberalizing reform, this is not the case for low
levels of salience. The findings presented in Figure 6 and 7 thus support hypothesis 3.
The anticipated competitiveness of elections only affects government parties’ likelihood
to introduce liberal reforms if immigration is a salient issue. In that, these findings are
in line with the results of previous studies that low levels of issue salience are conducive
for liberal change in the area of citizenship and immigration. This relationship remains
largely unchanged if we take into account the interaction effect specified in Model 2. The
regression table for this model as well as the predicted probabilities plot can be found
in the Appendix.
4.2 Robustness
As outlined before, the measurement of liberal reform that has been used in the previous
section excludes cases were restrictive laws were passed. While there are only 24 cases of
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restrictive reform in this sample, this could still bias the findings. Hence, as a robustness
check all analyses were repeated using a multinomial logit distinguishing between no
change, restrictive change and liberal change as potential outcomes. Figure 8, 9 and 10
summarize the findings from these analyses. The regression table can be found in the
Appendix.
[Insert Figure 8 - Predicted Probabilities - Government Ideology and Veto Points
MNL Model - about here]
[Insert Figure 9 - Predicted Probabilities - Electoral Competitiveness MNL
Model - about here]
[Insert Figure 10 - Predicted Probabilities - Electoral Competitiveness and Issue
Salience MNL model - about here]
All graphs confirm the earlier findings and support hypothesis 1, 2 and 3. Figure 8
shows how the effect of government ideology depends on the presence of a veto point.
Again, we can clearly see that there is only a statistically significant difference in the
absence of a veto point. This relationship is substantively in the same ball park as
earlier. If veto points give right-of-center parties the opportunity to block legislation
then the likelihood of a left government passing liberal reform is significantly reduced.
We also see a similar picture for the effect of electoral competitiveness in Figure 9. With
increasing levels of electoral competition the likelihood of governments passing a liberal
reform is significantly reduced. As Figure 10 demonstrates, this effect can be clearly seen
for higher levels of issue salience but is susbstantively weaker for low levels of salience. In
short, all main findings hold when running a multinomial logit instead of a logit model
that excludes cases with restrictive reforms.
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5 Conclusion
This article demonstrates that political institutions and electoral competition play a
crucial role for determining changes in immigration policies. While a growing body of
literature has analyzed how parties’ ideologies and public opinion affect changes in this
area, they largely do not take into account the institutional context of policy-making.
This research makes the problematic assumption that government actors’ preferences
are directly translated into policy outputs, whereas the links between the actors and the
rules structuring their behavior are ignored, or at least under-investigated.
This study contributes to this literature by providing a novel framework for the anal-
ysis of immigration reform and by demonstrating its usefulness for explaining empirical
variations in 11 industrialized democracies. It shows how political institutions in the
form of veto points can block left-of-center governments from passing liberal reforms.
The analysis also confirms that government parties that are anticipating elections to be
very competitive are far more susceptible to an anti-immigrant public opinion. If the
issue of immigration is salient and government parties expect close races the likelihood
of liberal change becomes very small.
In a more abstract sense this studies applied a new-institutionalist perspective to the
study of citizenship and immigration policies. It is the basic idea of new-institutionalism
in political science that in order to analyze the policy-making process it is necessary to
not just regard policy outputs as results of actors’ preferences, but to analyze the rules
that structure actors’ goals, choices and behavior. Consequently, the aggregation of
individuals’ preferences and their behavior cannot be regarded as the driving force of
the policy-making process or politics more generally, but one needs to take into account
the interplay of institutions and actors (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Immergut, 1998). This
study follows this reasoning and derives parties’ preferences from the interplay of party
competition and public opinion. Moreover, it shows how institutional constraints such
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as veto points limit parties in their possibility to turn their preferences into policies.
There are several avenues for further research that could build on this study and its
findings. While this paper focuses on explaining liberal change, a similar framework
could be used to analyze restrictive reforms such as the introduction of naturalization
tests. Moreover, feedback effects should be investigated more thoroughly. How do
policies in this field not only affect citizens attitudes but also the dynamics of electoral
competition on the issues of citizenship and immigration? Finally, the analysis should
move beyond the analysis of the usual suspects of Western Europe and North America
and include other democracies such as in Eastern Europe which show big variation in
their immigration policies. In short, much more research in this field will be needed.
The presented framework and analysis, however, hopefully prove to be a useful basis for
these research agendas.
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Table 1: Determinants of Immigration Reform
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Left government 0.466 1.109∗∗∗ 0.430 0.523
(0.478) (0.321) (0.478) (0.542)
Open veto point -0.233 0.217 0.780∗∗ 0.923∗∗
(0.345) (0.387) (0.343) (0.450)
Radical right -0.769∗ -0.808∗ -0.924∗∗ -0.787∗∗
(0.427) (0.422) (0.370) (0.332)
Salience 0.066 0.043 -0.006 0.121
(0.078) (0.077) (0.124) (0.173)
Immigration 0.103∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.040) (0.043) (0.044)
Tradeopenness 0.007 0.009∗ 0.013 0.017
(0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.011)
Growth 1.564 0.734 2.428 2.324
(4.562) (4.614) (5.195) (5.254)
Welfare generosity 0.021 0.028 -0.040 -0.064
(0.037) (0.040) (0.064) (0.070)
EU 1.599∗∗∗ 1.619∗∗∗ 1.070∗∗ 1.040∗∗
(0.583) (0.529) (0.533) (0.521)
Strong courts 0.660∗∗ 0.644∗∗ 0.645 0.671
(0.290) (0.292) (0.590) (0.567)
Left X Veto -1.175
(0.747)
Competitiveness -1.340∗∗∗ -0.486
(0.376) (0.762)
Comp X Salience -0.373
(0.352)
Constant -5.047∗∗∗ -5.619∗∗∗ -2.924 -2.802
(1.147) (1.188) (1.878) (1.763)
Observations 219 219 172 172
Logit models for immigration reform
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
All models include a spell counter and three cubic splines
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Descriptive statistics
Table A1: Descriptive statistics
mean sd min max N
Immigration reform 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 286
Left government 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 352
Radical right representation 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 352
Immigration per capita 6.60 3.69 0.11 20.56 298
Tradeopenness 74.99 30.77 28.57 169.01 352
Growth 0.02 0.03 -0.10 0.14 352
Welfare generosity 34.35 6.76 20.40 46.60 335
EU 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 352
Strong courts 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 352
Open veto point 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 352
Competitiveness 0.42 0.30 0.00 0.99 278
A-1
Table A2: Determinants of Immigration Reform - Multinomial Logit
(1) (2) (3)
Liberal Change (Reference No Change)
Left government 1.118∗∗∗ 0.387 0.471
(0.317) (0.445) (0.503)
Open veto point 0.258 0.808∗∗ 0.978∗∗
(0.379) (0.331) (0.457)
Left X Veto -1.223∗
(0.704)
Radical right -0.853∗∗ -0.960∗∗∗ -0.849∗∗∗
(0.421) (0.350) (0.299)
Salience 0.023 -0.032 0.121
(0.078) (0.132) (0.181)
Immigration 0.105∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.033) (0.037)
Tradeopenness 0.011∗∗ 0.015 0.019∗
(0.005) (0.010) (0.011)
Growth -0.104 1.042 0.507
(4.734) (5.531) (5.627)
Welfare generosity 0.023 -0.047 -0.070
(0.038) (0.060) (0.066)
EU 1.532∗∗∗ 0.973∗ 0.963∗
(0.502) (0.510) (0.497)
Strong courts 0.646∗∗ 0.676 0.682
(0.289) (0.598) (0.583)
Competitiveness -1.314∗∗∗ -0.382
(0.358) (0.763)
Comp X Salience -0.401
(0.338)
Constant -5.425∗∗∗ -2.610 -2.560
(1.280) (1.844) (1.729)
Observations 243 191 191
Multinomial logit models for immigration reform
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
All models include a spell counter and three cubic splines
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A3: Determinants of Immigration Reform - Complementary Log-Log
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Left government 0.434 1.026∗∗∗ 0.360 0.441
(0.379) (0.286) (0.361) (0.396)
Open veto point -0.185 0.242 0.648∗∗∗ 0.773∗∗
(0.254) (0.300) (0.241) (0.338)
Radical right -0.638∗ -0.671∗ -0.810∗∗ -0.700∗∗
(0.364) (0.361) (0.338) (0.294)
Salience 0.046 0.022 -0.019 0.086
(0.065) (0.064) (0.124) (0.163)
Immigration 0.095∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030)
Tradeopenness 0.007 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011 0.016
(0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.010)
Growth 2.168 1.256 2.740 2.591
(3.893) (3.988) (4.525) (4.505)
Welfare generosity 0.010 0.016 -0.041 -0.061
(0.030) (0.032) (0.063) (0.064)
EU 1.406∗∗∗ 1.427∗∗∗ 0.898∗∗ 0.838∗
(0.501) (0.446) (0.458) (0.450)
Strong courts 0.551∗∗ 0.560∗∗ 0.533 0.577
(0.234) (0.239) (0.501) (0.475)
Left X Veto -1.048
(0.654)
Competitiveness -1.070∗∗∗ -0.337
(0.281) (0.667)
Comp X Salience -0.330
(0.338)
Constant -4.579∗∗∗ -5.188∗∗∗ -2.617 -2.530∗
(0.935) (1.047) (1.647) (1.532)
Observations 219 219 172 172
Cloglog models for immigration reform
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
All models include a spell counter and three cubic splines
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A4: Determinants of Immigration Reform - Logit with Carter/Signorino
Correction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Left government 0.466 1.092∗∗∗ 0.480 0.572
(0.472) (0.342) (0.453) (0.521)
Open veto point -0.165 0.273 0.843∗∗ 0.980∗∗
(0.350) (0.393) (0.349) (0.451)
Radical right -0.729∗ -0.771∗ -0.862∗∗ -0.720∗∗
(0.405) (0.394) (0.353) (0.345)
Salience 0.064 0.042 -0.001 0.121
(0.071) (0.068) (0.103) (0.140)
Immigration 0.103∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.043) (0.046) (0.045)
Tradeopenness 0.007 0.009∗ 0.012 0.017
(0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.011)
Growth 2.115 1.201 3.093 3.009
(4.623) (4.715) (5.552) (5.615)
Welfare generosity 0.020 0.027 -0.037 -0.059
(0.036) (0.039) (0.054) (0.064)
EU 1.547∗∗ 1.567∗∗∗ 1.001∗ 0.980∗
(0.602) (0.549) (0.565) (0.553)
Strong courts 0.665∗∗ 0.650∗∗ 0.646 0.686
(0.285) (0.281) (0.530) (0.506)
Left X Veto -1.143
(0.749)
Competitiveness -1.366∗∗∗ -0.559
(0.355) (0.687)
Comp X Salience -0.357
(0.329)
Constant -5.187∗∗∗ -5.768∗∗∗ -3.305∗∗ -3.222∗∗
(0.964) (1.067) (1.386) (1.276)
Observations 219 219 172 172
Logit models for immigration reform
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
All models include a spell counter
and a squared and cubic spell counter
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A5: Determinants of Immigration Reform - Model including both interactions
(1)
Left government 0.897∗
(0.479)
Open veto point 1.095∗∗
(0.457)
Left X Veto -0.686
(0.996)
Competitiveness -0.492
(0.727)
meanim 0.121
(0.181)
compmeanim -0.359
(0.367)
Radical right representation -0.865∗∗
(0.387)
Immigration per capita 0.172∗∗∗
(0.045)
Tradeopenness 0.017∗
(0.010)
Growth 1.891
(5.466)
Welfare generosity -0.047
(0.090)
EU 1.068∗∗
(0.480)
Strong courts 0.651
(0.547)
Constant -3.422
(2.323)
Observations 172
Logit models for immigration reform
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
All models include a spell counter and three cubic splines
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure A1: Predicted Probabilities based on Table A5
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Table A6: Determinants of Immigration Reform - Negative Binomial
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Left government 0.391 0.926∗∗∗ 0.337 0.409
(0.362) (0.231) (0.364) (0.403)
Open veto point -0.143 0.245 0.688∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗
(0.247) (0.273) (0.178) (0.267)
Radical right -0.534∗ -0.570∗ -0.721∗∗ -0.626∗∗
(0.316) (0.311) (0.281) (0.272)
Salience 0.045 0.028 -0.001 0.081
(0.055) (0.054) (0.088) (0.110)
Immigration 0.078∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.022) (0.029) (0.029)
Tradeopenness 0.004 0.006∗ 0.008 0.012
(0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.009)
Growth 0.145 -0.415 0.545 0.450
(3.111) (3.177) (3.902) (3.792)
Welfare generosity 0.017 0.025 -0.021 -0.037
(0.030) (0.032) (0.046) (0.049)
EU 0.983∗∗ 1.005∗∗∗ 0.533 0.514
(0.412) (0.369) (0.398) (0.383)
Strong courts 0.459∗∗ 0.458∗∗ 0.353 0.381
(0.215) (0.222) (0.380) (0.372)
Left X Veto -0.973∗∗
(0.449)
Competitiveness -1.032∗∗∗ -0.483
(0.293) (0.473)
Comp X Salience -0.249
(0.246)
Constant -3.958∗∗∗ -4.520∗∗∗ -2.655∗∗ -2.613∗∗
(0.820) (0.847) (1.293) (1.257)
Observations 219 219 172 172
Ngeavtive binomial regression for immigration reform
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
All models include a spell counter and three cubic splines
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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